The Emergence and Future of Central Counterparties by Thorsten V. Koeppl & Cyril Monnet
QED
Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 1241














Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
First Version: September 2009
This Version: September 2010
Abstract
We explain why central counterparties (CCPs) emerged historically. With standardized
contracts, it is optimal to insure counterparty risk by clearing those contracts through
a CCP that uses novation and mutualization. As netting is not essential for these
services, it does not explain why CCPs exist. In over-the-counter markets, as contracts
are customized and not fungible, a CCP cannot fully guarantee contract performance.
Still, a CCP can help: As bargaining leads to an ineﬃcient allocation of default risk
relative to the gains from customization, a transfer scheme is needed. A CCP can
implement it by oﬀering partial insurance for customized contracts.
Keywords: Counterparty Risk, Novation, Mutualization, Over-the-counter Markets, Cus-
tomized Financial Contracts
JEL Classiﬁcation: G2, G13, D53, D82
∗We thank V.V. Chari, Todd Keister, Ed Nosal, Chris Phelan and Pierre-Olivier Weill for their comments.
We also thank the audience at the many conferences and institutions where we presented this paper. Part of
this work was completed while Cyril Monnet was the John Weatherall fellow at the Department of Economics
at Queen’s University. Research funding from SSHRC grant 410-2006-0481 supported this work. The views
expressed are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.
This paper is available free of charge at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-
papers/.
11 Introduction
A central counterparty (CCP) is an institution designed to insure counterparty risk. After
ﬁnancial trades are executed, the clearing process reconciles the terms of the trades to make
them legally binding. This, however, need not prevent default. Adding a CCP to this
clearing process oﬀers two additional services to deal with the costs of a possible default: (i)
novation and (ii) mutualization of losses. Novation refers to the legal act of replacing the
original contract between the buyer and the seller with a contract between the buyer and
the CCP and another one between the seller and the CCP. By doing so, the CCP erases
the original obligations between the buyer and the seller and becomes the sole counterparty
to both the original buyer and seller. As a consequence, if the CCP is able to fulﬁll the
contract, it eliminates the idiosyncratic risk borne by a trader that his particular counterparty
defaults. Still, this does not mean that a CCP eliminates default risk altogether. Rather,
the CCP needs to make sure that it has enough resources to cover this risk using proper
risk management tools, such as collateral in the form of margins. Should margins not oﬀer
enough resources, it can ask its members to cover its losses; in other words, it mutualizes its
losses.
When ﬁnancial trades are taking place on centralized trading platforms like the New York
Stock Exchange or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, clearing takes place through a CCP.
Other markets do not have formal clearing arrangements: These are often described as over-
the-counter markets (OTC) where trades do not take place on a formal/organized trading
platform but are instead bilaterally negotiated. Even before the current ﬁnancial crisis,
many observers criticized the organization of these markets, in particular for their lack
of transparency and counterparty risk management. As trades are bilateral, there is no
information about who is trading which securities and at what price, with the consequence
that risk exposures are diﬃcult to manage. As a consequence, policies have been adopted to
impose mandatory clearing through a CCP for a large fraction of standard OTC derivatives
to improve transparency and stability in these markets.1
We present a framework that explains why CCP-clearing – by which we mean the process
of novation and mutualization – has emerged as an eﬃcient part of the market structure on
centralized trading platforms. Then we analyze whether it can and should be introduced
for OTC markets as well.2 To do so, we distinguish between standardized and customized
1In the US, the Frank-Dodd bill requires clearing for all suﬃciently standardized derivatives. Other
proposal point to a minimum fraction of volume and/or value of the OTC market to be formally cleared (see
for example BIS (2007) or IMF (2010)).
2We do not look at two other services – multilateral netting (see Duﬃe and Zhu (2009) and the provision
2ﬁnancial contracts in a highly stylized way along two dimensions: fungibility and trading
protocol. Standardized contracts are traded competitively on a centralized market with an
organized trading protocol. As a consequence, they can be forced to be cleared through a
CCP.3 Such contracts are fungible: The contract can be easily replaced by the same contract
at any given point in time through a market trade. Once contracts, however, are customized
to the needs of their counterparties, they are less fungible and can escape any mandatory
clearing. Since these contracts are customized, there is no formal market where they can
be traded or replaced. Also, their speciﬁc terms are bilaterally negotiated directly between
the counterparties. The degree of customization is thus endogenous, making it extremely
diﬃcult to mandate CCP clearing as part of the trading arrangement.4 Hence, CCP clearing
of OTC transactions needs to recognize the limited fungibility of contracts and the need to
provide incentives for their formal clearing.5
When ﬁnancial contracts are standardized, we ﬁnd that an eﬃcient allocation is implemented
when agents trade on a centralized exchange, where a mutualized CCP novates trade. Nova-
tion diversiﬁes counterparty risk, thus reducing the need for collateral, while mutualization
insures against the cost of default. Therefore, the CCP can guarantee the full terms of
trade. This explains the prevalence of such clearing arrangements on formal exchanges. To
the contrary, when contracts are customized, we ﬁnd that an eﬃcient allocation cannot be
implemented for two reasons. First, the scope for insurance through mutualization is limited
due to a lack of fungibility. Second, the trading protocol (in our case bilateral bargaining)
introduces the ineﬃciency that – relative to the gains from customization – some counterpar-
ties take on too much default risk, while others take on too little. A revenue-neutral transfer
scheme could improve the allocation by skewing default risk toward trades with larger gains
from customization. But the scheme still needs to give incentives to traders to reveal their
of trade information (see Koeppl, Monnet and Temzelides (2009) and Acharya and Bisin (2009)) – that are
often associated with CCP clearing but need not be performed by a CCP. Leitner (2009) develops a model
of a data warehouse that could be taken up by a CCP.
3For example, once the traders agree to buy or sell, the clearing process automatically sends the contract
to the CCP for novation. As such, the agreement to buy or sell includes the agreement to CCP-clearing.
4Commonly, a distinction is being made between OTC transactions in standardized and customized
contracts. One can argue, however, that any OTC transaction is intrinsically customized as it involves
a bilateral trading environment rather than a centralized exchange. Trading on a centralized exchange is
usually combined with a speciﬁc clearing arrangement oﬀered by a clearinghouse. In general, counterparties
can always choose to suﬃciently customize a transaction – including the clearing arrangement itself – thereby
eﬀectively preventing mandatory clearing by a CCP for suﬃciently standardized assets.
5Kroszner (1999) gives an historical account of how standardization of ﬁnancial contracts was crucial for
the formation of centralized markets with formal clearing arrangements. As assets became standardized,
they could easily be cleared through a CCP and traders worried less or not at all about counterparty risk.
As a consequence, they could accept anonymous counterparties, which expanded their set of possible trades.
The account, however, is silent on the beneﬁts and eﬀects of customized contracts.
3trades in customized contracts. Interestingly, a CCP can provide such incentives in the form
of gains from diversifying counterparty risk (i.e., novation), thereby improving the allocation
to a second best. Hence, there is room for (limited) CCP clearing of OTC contracts even if
they are customized, albeit for a fundamentally diﬀerent reason than on a centralized trading
platform.
This yields three important insights for reorganizing OTC markets that go beyond issues
related to systemic risk, standardization, and netting.6 First, mandating formal clearing
for standardized contracts might not be eﬀective to increase transparency: Traders need
incentives to also submit for formal clearing OTC transactions that are easily customized.
CCP clearing can provide incentives for formal clearing as long as it oﬀers enough direct
beneﬁts. Second, these gains are linked to the beneﬁts of novation, which can be oﬀered
by a CCP even for customized contracts, and are not related to netting.7 Third, trading
of customized ﬁnancial contracts can lead to a misallocation of risk. Introducing a CCP
for OTC trades can improve the allocation by inﬂuencing the terms of trade of customized
contracts.
We design a model that allows us to study the economics of clearing in general and that is
inspired by the history of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange operating as a futures exchange
as described by Kroszner (1999). Risk-averse farmers have to decide on how much wheat
to grow before they know the demand for wheat by, say, bakers. The demand for wheat by
bakers is uncertain, however, due to an aggregate demand shock. Therefore, farmers’ income
– and, hence, their consumption – is uncertain. To insure against this income risk, farmers
can trade futures contracts; i.e., they can trade promises to deliver some wheat in the future
at a given price.
However, futures contracts oﬀer only limited insurance when there is a risk of default. In our
model, each farmer has to deal with a single baker that can go bust. If a farmer contracted
with a bankrupt baker, he does not need to deliver his wheat and can still sell it on the spot
market, but at the spot price. As a consequence, a farmer who is trading futures still faces
two types of risk: ﬁrst, the risk that his counterparty goes bust, and second, the associated
6Formal multilateral netting institutionalizes the tear up and compression of redundant trades that are
often used to oﬀset exposures between counterparties in these markets. The potential for such netting
increases with more standardized contracts. It can reduce systemic risk and achieve savings in collateral
costs but need not be oﬀered within a CCP structure. The failure of Lehman Brothers makes this point clear,
as an emergency round of compressions was quite eﬀectively carried out without having a CCP structure in
place. However, the reestablishment of positions was more diﬃcult, as this involved an allocation of losses
associated with the failure of Lehman as a counterparty (see IMF (2010)).
7Multilateral netting becomes less eﬀective as the degree of customization rises and can even lead to
opportunity costs that outweigh its beneﬁts (see Duﬃe and Zhu (2009)). Furthermore, if netting reduces
systemic risk, this beneﬁt is not directly enjoyed by the counterparties to the trade.
4price risk of having to sell his wheat in the spot market.
We then study three risk management tools adding them in succession: collateral, novation,
and mutualization of losses. We model collateral as an asset, gold, that bakers can produce
on demand. Posting collateral is costly as it includes a deadweight loss, but it can be seized
if a baker goes bust. The deadweight loss reduces the attractiveness of a futures contract for
bakers and thus the price of a futures contract. Hence, insurance against default through
collateral is costly, and as a consequence, farmers do not fully insure against default.
With novation, a third party – called CCP – becomes the seller of wheat to all bakers.
Hence, while some bakers still go bust, the CCP does not face idiosyncratic default risk as
its position is completely diversiﬁed. Therefore, novation eliminates counterparty risk for
farmers by pooling idiosyncratic counterparty risk. As this is costless, the optimal collateral
policy is to require no collateral.8 While novation eliminates counterparty risk, it does not
eliminate the price risk for farmers. When bakers go bust, the CCP still has to sell the
wheat on the spot market at the equilibrium price. Therefore, its revenue also depends on
the spot price, which in turn depends on the aggregate demand for wheat; in other words, the
CCP incurs replacement cost risk that is state-dependent. Because the promised payment
to farmers depends on the CCP revenue, farmers still face the original price risk.
Mutualization of losses, however, eliminates the remaining price risk. Adopting a “survivor-
pays-rule,” the CCP can impose an additional payment from bakers who did not go bust when
wheat was cheap. To make it worthwhile for bakers, the CCP must compensate bakers with
a transfer when wheat is expensive. In this way, the CCP can make its revenue independent
of the aggregate demand shock. In our framework, farmers are then fully insured against the
aggregate uncertainty and are guaranteed to receive the exact value of their futures contract.
Our key result here is that a CCP can lower collateral requirements because it can reduce
risk exposures for market participants more eﬃciently. This is not due to netting, but due
to diversifying risk (novation) and insuring against it (mutualization).
In the second part of the paper, we address the question of the role for CCP clearing on OTC
markets. Such markets are characterized by customized contracts that are traded bilaterally
and are not fungible in the sense that it is very hard to replace them (extreme replacement
cost risk). We also assume that the gains from customized contracts diﬀer across trades. To
capture these features, we introduce the possibility for farmers to produce special or “exotic”
types of wheat. Bakers now would like to consume both, exotic and plain wheat. Exotic
wheat can only be traded bilaterally as it has to be produced by a farmer to meet the speciﬁc
8This certainly seems extreme but is due to default being exogenous. Were defaults endogenous (i.e.,
strategic), it would still be optimal to require some collateral as an incentive device.
5needs of a baker. Importantly, this implies that exotic wheat is not fungible, as only the
individual baker for which the wheat has been produced values it. Hence, if the baker for
which the exotic wheat has been produced goes bust, the wheat cannot be sold in the spot
market. Finally, the gain from customization varies across trades in the sense that the gains
from consuming exotic wheat diﬀers across bakers.
Farmers have to decide between producing either plain wheat (and selling it via a futures
contract) or exotic wheat (and selling it OTC forward). If they trade OTC, they are matched
with a baker. For farmers, the cost of trading OTC is that exotic wheat has no value on
the spot market in case a baker defaults. Hence, farmers will require costly collateral to
insure against default. The beneﬁt of trading OTC is that the farmer makes a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer9 to the baker, and therefore, can extract all the baker’s surplus. This means
that farmers will trade OTC with bakers only if the OTC contract generates enough surplus;
i.e., if a baker’s valuation of their exotic wheat is high enough. This gives us a threshold
valuation below which farmers prefer to trade on the futures market and that determines
the relative size of the futures and OTC market.
There are several sources of ineﬃciencies on the OTC market. First, farmers again face the
risk that their counterparty defaults. A CCP can again alleviate this ineﬃciency through
novation exactly as in the futures market – by pooling default risk, but across all exotic
wheat. Fungibility, however, restricts now what the CCP can oﬀer. In our stylized setup, it
can only pay out the expected payment from the trade, as any default on a contract implies
an irrecoverable total loss (i.e., the replacement cost risk is extreme). In other words, the
CCP cannot oﬀer insurance against the aggregate cost of default.10 Thus, farmers receive
always less than the negotiated price when the trade is settled by the CCP, independent
of whether their original counterparty defaults or not. Nonetheless, novation makes OTC
trading in exotic wheat more attractive, leading to an increase in its size relative to the
futures market.
Second, the size of each OTC trade need not reﬂect the valuation of a baker for his particular
exotic wheat. Indeed, in our setup, bilaterally negotiated trades lead to a ﬁxed amount of
wheat produced across trades of exotic wheat. Therefore, given a ﬁxed probability of default,
the default exposure is then also constant across trades. This is ineﬃcient from a social point
of view, as the size of an OTC trade should increase with the gains from customization for
the baker. In other words, it is socially eﬃcient when default risk is skewed toward trades
9Our results are robust to changes in bargaining power.
10More generally, the less fungible the traded contracts are, the higher the replacement cost risk and,
hence, the lower the scope to insure against it via mutualization.
6with high gains from producing exotic wheat. A revenue-neutral transfer scheme can achieve
this by taxing the surplus from matches with high gains and subsidizing matches with low
gains. The intuition for this result is straightforward. A tax or subsidy directly changes
the surplus in the match – and indirectly the bargaining power. Since farmers have market
power to price the contract, they will try to maintain their proﬁt margin by producing
more or less wheat. Somewhat counterintuitively, a tax (subsidy) makes it harder (easier)
to extract surplus and gives farmers incentives to produce more (less) exotic wheat. The
negotiated payment will decrease, however, as it is given by the marginal beneﬁt from the
contract for the buyer. This result holds even when the gains from trading exotic wheat
cannot be directly observed by the CCP. The reason is that our bargaining assumptions lead
to a distribution of surplus where matches with low gains from trading exotic wheat cannot
mimic matches with higher gains.11
A CCP is well placed to implement the transfer scheme. A farmer matched with a baker
needs to have an incentive to reveal its trade but potentially faces a transfer payment.
With novation, the CCP can still induce revelation as it oﬀers savings in collateral costs.
This makes novation an important prerequisite for inﬂuencing the allocation of risk in OTC
markets. CCP clearing of OTC trades then contrasts sharply with mutualization of losses
through a CCP in the futures market. The former redistributes default risk by indirectly
inﬂuencing the terms of trades to correct an ineﬃcient distribution of default risk across
diﬀerent trades.12 To the contrary, the “survivor-pays-rule” is state-dependent and does not
inﬂuence the terms of trades at all. It is an insurance transfer that allocates default losses
optimally across diﬀerent states.
We present the model in Section 2, and we analyze optimal trading and clearing arrangements
for standard assets in Section 3. The results on customized assets and OTC trades are
presented in Section 4, that also includes the case with private information. We conclude in
Section 5.
11Interestingly, with private information, the CCP must be able to decline clearing of certain trades in
order to implement the transfer scheme.
12The transfer scheme falls short of achieving full eﬃciency that would require a direct change in the
distribution of bargaining power for OTC transactions. This could be done via intermediating OTC trades,
which goes beyond the clearing of trades.
72 The Environment
We describe now a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. The fact that mar-
kets are incomplete is important as agents will not be able to perfectly insure against two
sources of risk. The ﬁrst risk arises from an aggregate demand shock leading to price ﬂuctua-
tions, while the second one is related to default on trades, in the sense that some counterparty
will be unable to make good on its promises. This allows us to analyze how a particular
asset structure in combination with clearing arrangements can complete the market.
2.1 Model
The economy has two periods and there are two goods: Gold that is storable and wheat.
There is a measure 1 of farmers that can produce wheat. Producing wheat, however, takes
time: any amount needs to be produced in t = 1 for consumption in t = 2. There are
many possible states in t = 2, which we denote by θ. For simplicity, we represent a farmer’s
preferences by the following expected utility,
U(x(θ),q) = −q + Eθ [logx(θ)],
where x(θ) is the amount of gold consumed at date 2 in state θ and q ≥ 0 is the amount
of wheat produced . We take expectations only over second period utility as no uncertainty
will be resolved at t = 1.
There is also a measure 1/(1 − δ) > 1 of bakers in the economy that can produce gold in
both periods for consumption in t = 2. To introduce the idea of default, we assume that
bakers die with probability δ at the end of t = 1, so that there is only a measure 1 of bakers
alive in t = 2. A baker’s death is a random event that does not depend on the action of the
baker. Again, we assume that a baker’s expected utility takes the following simple form
V (y (θ,θi),x1,x2 (θ,θi)) = −µx1 + (1 − δ)Eθi,θ [θi log(y (θ,θi)) − x2 (θ,θi)],
where the parameter θi is a preference shock for the baker realized in t = 2, y is the amount
of wheat consumed in t = 2, x1 ≥ 0 is the amount of gold produced in the ﬁrst period, and
x2 is the net production of gold in the second period.13 To capture the idea that it is in
general costly to pledge collateral, we assume that producing gold is more costly in the ﬁrst
period, i.e., µ > 1. Finally, we model the preference shock θi with the aggregate component
13If x2 < 0, a baker consumes gold in t = 2.
8θ and an idiosyncratic component εi according to
θi = θ + εi,
where θ is drawn from a distribution F with mean 1 and εi is iid drawn from a distribution
G with mean 0. Therefore, θ denotes the aggregate state in t = 2.
2.2 Trading Frictions
We now discuss the role of some of our assumptions and how they help us in getting to the
idea of a CCP. First, farmers need to produce wheat in the ﬁrst period, before the realization
of the aggregate demand shock θ. Given their preferences, they will want to insure against
this shock by locking in the price. Full prepayment, however, is costly, but one can trade
futures contracts, in which bakers promise to pay gold against delivery of wheat in the second
period. With full commitment such a promise is credible.
Second, bakers can die, which implies the possibility for default on the futures contract.
Thus, whenever farmers trade with a speciﬁc baker in the ﬁrst period, they face a default
exposure. While being insured against the demand shock, a farmer who writes a futures
contract now faces a default risk that eﬀectively limits this insurance.
Third, an individual baker’s utility for wheat is realized only in the second period. So, at
the time a baker purchases a futures contract, he does not yet know his exact preference for
wheat. This creates the need for bakers to trade among themselves, since there are gains
from trade between bakers with high and low idiosyncratic shocks. This gives us a rationale
to introduce a spot market in period 2.
To summarize, our environment formalizes the fundamental frictions that will allow us to
endogenize the need for futures contracts and proper clearing arrangements. Spot trading
of wheat can allocate wheat across surviving bakers eﬃciently. A futures contract between
an individual farmer and baker can partially insure against the aggregate demand shock but
exposes farmers to counterparty default. Collateral in form of prepayment by gold that has
been produced early can insure against such default but is costly. This provides a rationale
for clearing arrangements that can provide cheaper and better insurance against default
risk. In the next section, we look at diﬀerent market mechanisms and how close they fare in
achieving a benchmark, which is the ﬁrst-best allocation without trading frictions.
92.3 The First-Best Allocation
As a benchmark for our environment, we consider a social welfare function that gives equal
weight to all farmers and bakers. A (symmetric) ﬁrst best is described by an allocation of
gold (x∗,x∗
1,x∗
2) and an allocation of wheat (q∗,y∗) across farmers and bakers, measurable
with respect to the realized shocks. Given any realization of θi across bakers, it will be
suﬃcient to only use the aggregate shock θ to deﬁne the allocation of gold across farmers;
therefore we denote it by x∗(θ). Similarly, the optimal allocation for bakers will depend
only on the aggregate shock and a baker’s idiosyncratic shock; hence we simply denote it by
x∗
2(θ,θi) and y∗(θ,θi) respectively. All other allocations cannot depend on the realization of
the shocks in period t = 2. A ﬁrst-best allocation solves the following problem
max log(x(θ)) − q +
Z





y(θ,θi)dG ≤ q for all θ (1)
x(θ) ≤
Z
x1 + x2(θ,θi)dG for all θ. (2)
The objective function takes into account that some of the bakers will die after the ﬁrst
period. The constraints (1) and (2) are resource constraints for the consumption of wheat
and gold for any given realization of the aggregate shock.
Consumption of gold takes place only in the second period, and it is ineﬃcient to produce gold
early on, as µ > 1 and δ > 0. Hence, the eﬃcient allocation has no early production of gold,
x∗
1 = 0. Also, the strict concavity of the farmers’ utility function from their consumption of
gold implies that it is optimal to insure farmers perfectly against the aggregate demand shock.
Similarly, our assumption on preferences implies that bakers’ consumption is proportional to
his realized preference for wheat. It is straightforward to verify that the optimal allocation
satisﬁes x∗(θ) = 1, q∗ = 1 and y∗(θ,θi) = θi/θ with x∗
2(θ,θi) being indeterminate.
3 Eﬃcient Trading and Clearing Arrangements
3.1 Spot Market
We assume ﬁrst that there is only a perfectly competitive market in t = 2, where bakers can
purchase wheat from farmers against gold. We call this market the spot market, because in
10this market any trade is immediately settled with gold and each unit of wheat costs p(θ)
units of gold. Wheat is produced in the ﬁrst period so that the quantity of wheat q available
later on is ﬁxed.
The problem of a baker entering the spot market with wealth equal to ω units of gold is then
˜ V (ω) = max
y,x2
θi log(y) − x2 (3)
subject to
p(θ)y ≤ x2 + ω.
Since the budget constraint will hold with equality, we can rewrite this problem as
˜ V (ω) = ω + max
y
θi log(y) − p(θ)y.
Hence, the demand of bakers is independent of initial wealth ω. Since gold is more expensive
to produce in t = 1, bakers will not produce any gold early on. This implies that we can set
ω = 0.
We now turn to the problem of farmers in the spot market. Farmers have q units of wheat to
sell. Since farmers do not value wheat in the second period, they will sell all wheat against
gold. For each unit, they get p(θ) so that they can consume p(θ)q units of gold. Farmers then
choose their initial investment in wheat to maximize their expected payoﬀ, taking as given
the spot price of wheat, p(θ) in t = 2. Note that a farmer is small; therefore his individual





with solution q = 1 for each farmer.
It will be convenient later on to deﬁne a spot market equilibrium in the following way. For an
aggregate supply of wheat Q, a spot market equilibrium in t = 2 is given by a price schedule
{p(θ)}θ and an allocation for bakers (y(θ,θi),x2(θ,θi)) for each state θ, such that (i) taking
p(θ) as given, bakers choose y(θ,θi) and x2(θ,θi) to solve (3) with ω = 0 and (ii) the market
for wheat clears for all θ,
R
y(θ,θi)dG(εi) = Q.
The solution to the baker’s problem is given by
y(θi) = θi/p(θ), (5)
11with x2 (θ,θi) = p(θ)y(θi). Using market clearing and the fact that in equilibrium Q = q = 1,
we obtain the equilibrium price for all θ,
p(θ) = θ/Q = θ, (6)
Note that our assumptions on preferences imply that both the equilibrium quantity produced
by farmers q = 1 and the equilibrium spot price p(θ) = θ will remain unchanged when we
vary the market structure later on.
A spot market for wheat in t = 2 suﬃces to allocate wheat optimally across bakers. Their
individual consumption of wheat and the expected payment are ﬁrst best, since we have
R
py(θi)dG(εi) = 1. Even though the bakers’ aggregate consumption stays constant, the
equilibrium spot price moves one for one with the aggregate demand shock θ. This implies
immediately that farmers’ consumption of gold depends on θ. Hence, they are not insured












− θidF × G. (7)
3.2 Futures Market
On top of the spot market in t = 2, we now add a futures market in the ﬁrst period where
agents trade futures contracts. A futures contract is basically a promise to deliver one unit
of wheat at t = 2 in exchange for gold.
We make the assumption that a farmer can trade only with a single baker. More precisely,
we postulate that bakers can acquire wheat either by trading in the futures market in t = 1
or by waiting and trading in the spot market in t = 2. Therefore, there will be trade on the
futures market only if bakers are at least as well oﬀ as trading on the spot market. If this
is the case, we will assume that a random measure 1 of bakers is selected to participate in
the futures market. In a symmetric equilibrium, all farmers will supply the same quantity
of futures contracts, and bakers will demand the same quantity. Therefore, we can assume
that one farmer is trading with a single baker. Bakers who are not selected to trade in the
futures market will buy wheat in the spot market.
This implies that a farmer is exposed to counterparty risk, as any single baker dies with
probability δ > 0. In this case, we say there is default.14 To insure against the risk of
14We choose to have an exogenous default rate because endogenous default introduces intricacies that
would blur the main message of this paper. The case with endogenous default is available from the authors
12Period 2
Period 1 Investment q = 1
pf
δ default (1 − δ) no default
Spot Market Settlement of Futures
collateral k
Futures Market pf = 1 + (1 − µ)k
p(θ) + k
Figure 1: Market Structure – Spot and Futures
default, farmers who are trading a futures contract may want to require bakers to post some
gold as collateral t = 1. We let k denote the required collateral per unit of wheat traded
forward.
A futures contract is a pair (pf,k), with the understanding that one contract entitles the
owner to one unit of wheat at a price pf with the requirement to pledge k units of collateral.
There is then no diﬀerence between pledging collateral and prepaying so that one can think
of it as settling an obligation by netting collateral with the ﬁnal payment. In case of default,
farmers are not required to honor their obligation from the futures contract to deliver wheat
so that they can still sell it on the spot market. Figure 1 depicts the market structure with
collateral.
If a baker purchases qb units of a futures contract (pf,k), he has a claim to qb units of
wheat in t = 2, subject to paying the futures price pf minus the collateral k he has already
pledged. Since he can also sell these units on the spot market at price p(θ), his net wealth
is given by ω = (p(θ) + k − pf)qb. Using the fact that his demand on the spot market y(θi)
is independent of his wealth position (see equation (5)), a baker will choose the number of
contracts qb to maximize his expected revenue, or
˜ V
f (pf,k) = max
qb
−µkqb + (1 − δ)
Z
(p(θ) + k − pf)qbdF(θ), (8)
where the ﬁrst term expresses the additional costs of securing the trade with collateral when
purchasing wheat forward.
Farmers can either sell their wheat in the futures market or in the spot market. However, we
upon request.
13can show that they prefer to lock in the price by selling their entire production in the futures
market. If farmers sell q futures contracts, q is also the amount of wheat available in t = 2.
If their counterparty does not default, the revenue from selling q units of futures contracts
is given by pfq. To the contrary, a farmer who faces default keeps the posted collateral kq
and sells his wheat on the spot market. Hence, he obtains a state-dependent revenue equal
to (p(θ) + k)q, where p(θ) is the equilibrium spot price. The farmer’s problem in period 1
is then given by
max
q
−q + (1 − δ)log(pfq) + δ
Z
log((p(θ) + k)q)dF(θ). (9)
Given a spot market price schedule {p(θ)}θ, a futures market equilibrium is a futures contract
(pf,k) and supply and demand of such contracts, such that (i) the demand qb solves (8), (ii)
the supply q solves (9), (iii) the market clears qb = q, and (iv) the price schedule {p(θ)}θ is
a spot equilibrium price schedule given q.
To solve for the futures contract price pf, bakers must be indiﬀerent between trading spot










Arbitrage pricing implies that bakers need to be fully compensated for the cost of posting
collateral, which is composed of the direct cost µ > 1 and the indirect cost that collateral
is lost for the baker if he dies (δ > 0). Hence, farmers bear all the cost of collateral, as
the futures price declines for any k. Moreover, given the equilibrium price (10), bakers are
indiﬀerent between pledging a high amount of collateral and a low price, or inversely.
Turning to the supply of futures contract, the solution to (9) is again given by q = 1. Since
only a measure 1 of bakers can participate in the futures market, market clearing implies
immediately that qb = q = 1 independent of the collateral policy.15 Hence, the aggregate
supply of wheat has not changed relative to the equilibrium with only a spot market. All
wheat is still allocated among bakers through spot trades in t = 2, yielding again the
15Since bakers are indiﬀerent between trading in futures or only in the spot market, in equilibrium some
bakers will not engage in futures transactions. Furthermore, our preference structure makes the amount
sold on the futures market independent of the price since the log function implies that the substitution
and revenue eﬀects cancel each other. With a more general utility function, the amount produced on the
futures market would be higher than if production was only traded spot, as a futures contract oﬀers partial
insurance.
14equilibrium spot price schedule p(θ) = θ. Thus, in equilibrium, we obtain
pf = 1 + (1 − µ(δ))k, (11)
where we have deﬁned the eﬀective cost of collateral for bakers by µ(δ) = µ/(1−δ) > 1. As
bakers are fully reimbursed for the collateral cost, welfare is given by
W
f = (1 − δ)log(1 + (1 − µ(δ))k) + δ
Z







− θidF × G,
(12)
where the ﬁrst term is the farmers’ utility from a performing futures contract (one where
the baker is still alive) and the second from seizing collateral and selling wheat in the spot
market when a counterparty defaults.
The equilibrium is parametrized by the amount of collateral k. To ﬁnd the optimal collateral
policy, we assume that bakers compete. Therefore, the optimal collateral policy maximizes
farmers’ welfare (9) given (11). Using collateral to get insurance is costly. Still, farmers
prefer using collateralized futures contract than only trading on the spot market as long
as the collateral cost is low or the default probability is high. The proof of this result is
relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Spot and futures markets with collateral (Pareto) dominate a spot market
alone. The equilibrium price on the futures market equals the expected spot price minus
collateral costs, i.e., pk
f = 1 + (1 − µ(δ))k ≤ 1.
It is never optimal for farmers to fully insure against default through collateral. The optimal
collateral policy is k∗ = 0, if and only if µ ≥ µ(δ) > 1, where ∂µ/∂δ > 0 for all δ > 0.
A futures market partially insures farmers against the aggregate price risk of selling wheat on
the spot market. The insurance is imperfect, as farmers face the risk that their counterparty
defaults with probability δ > 0. Then, farmers have to sell their wheat on the spot market
assuming risk in their consumption of gold. This gives rise to two sources of ineﬃciency
for farmers. First, default reintroduces aggregate price risk in the futures contract. And
second, farmers suﬀer from a lack of diversiﬁcation, as they can only trade with a speciﬁc
counterparty. One way to limit these risks is to require collateral.
Somewhat surprisingly, farmers never fully collateralize their trades. But the intuition is
simple. In case of default, farmers can still sell their production spot in period 2. If farmers
were to fully collateralize – i.e., require full prepayment (k = pf) – they would enjoy too
15much consumption in default states at the expense of lower consumption in nondefault
states. Therefore, they prefer to undercollateralize their exposures. This implies that costly
collateral is not a perfect substitute for insurance. Hence, we look next at better clearing
arrangements oﬀered through CCP clearing.
3.3 Central Counterparty Clearing
We now introduce the notion of a CCP. This is a third party such as a clearing agent or a
clearinghouse that clears all trades.16 While the CCP takes the terms of trades as given, it
can aﬀect them indirectly by modifying the trading environment, such as setting additional
collateral requirements.
3.3.1 Novation
Novation is a mechanism whereby the CCP becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller
to every buyer. More precisely, the original futures contract between a farmer and a baker
is superseded by two contracts: One between the farmer and the CCP and one between the
CCP and the baker. This means that farmers and bakers are now facing only the CCP in the
second period when settling futures contracts. Without loss of generality, we assume that
only the CCP can set and administer collateral requirements. Naturally, these requirements
will change the price of a futures contract, which we now denote by pn
f.
With novation, given q futures contracts (pn
f,k) have been signed in equilibrium, the revenue
of the CCP – and hence its payout to the farmers – in t = 2 is
R






(1 − δ)q + p(θ)δq. (13)
In this period, the CCP receives all payments from bakers and all wheat from farmers and
uses these proceeds to fulﬁll the obligations from the futures contracts.17 It can also seize the
16In its most primitive function, it could simply be a collateral storage facility. A collateral storage facility
might be necessary if farmers cannot commit to make the necessary investment in wheat when they sell
wheat forward against collateral. The third party then holds the collateral in escrow until the quantity
of wheat promised forward is released to the baker. Hence, with a two-sided strategic default problem, a
neutral third party that stores collateral is essential for managing default risk, as has been pointed out in a
companion paper (see Koeppl and Monnet, 2008). See also Mattesini, Monnet and Wright (2009). Rather
than making this notion precise in this framework, we abstract from this issue and assume that farmers can
perfectly commit.
17Novation is not a guarantee. In order for it to be a guarantee, we would have to require that the CCP
satisﬁes a solvency constraint. In other words, the CCP would guarantee to settle all trades at the price pn
f
16collateral of all bakers that default on their futures trade. The ﬁrst term in (13) is all of the
collateral that the CCP collects from bakers in the ﬁrst period, where we have used market
clearing qb = q. The second term is the overall gold payments – net of collateral postings
– made by nondefaulting bakers for settling their futures contracts. In exchange, the CCP
delivers a total of (1 − δ)q units of wheat. Finally, the CCP can sell the remaining amount
of wheat δq on the spot market at price p(θ), which is the ﬁnal term. The CCP’s revenue is
thus state-dependent, as the spot price of wheat varies with the aggregate demand shock.




−q + E log(R
n(θ)).
In the symmetric equilibrium,18 we have that qb = q = 1 and, hence, each farmer receives a
payment equal to
R









By no-arbitrage, the equilibrium futures price needs to make bakers indiﬀerent between
trading in the futures markets or only on the spot market. Hence, the equilibrium price is
unaﬀected by novation and it is given by
p
n
f = 1 + (1 − µ(δ))k. (15)




(1 − δ)(1 + (1 − µ(δ))k) + δ (θ + k)
￿
− 1. (16)
at which farmers sold wheat forward. This would pin down a collateral requirement, again inﬂuencing the
price. Our approach is more general as it also allows for a partial guarantee.
18The revenue is expressed for a symmetric equilibrium where all farmers produce the same quantity q.
Given all other farmers produce q, it is not beneﬁcial for a farmer to produce something else other than q
when the terms of the futures contract are (pn
f,k). To see this, suppose farmer i ∈ [0,1] produces qi. Then


















Given this payment from the CCP, a farmer’s production choice is independent of all other farmer’s choices.












with the solution again being qi = 1 for all i.
17Given collateral k, risk-averse farmers obtain the average revenue across all futures trades.
Novation thus acts as a substitute for diversiﬁcation ex-ante. If farmers cannot perfectly
diversify counterparty risk upfront, they can do so with a CCP that averages this exposure.
Since the bakers’ payoﬀ is independent of the collateral posted, the optimal collateral policy
maximizes a farmer’s expected payoﬀ. From equation (16), it is straightforward to see that
average consumption for farmers decreases with k.
Proposition 2. Novation perfectly diversiﬁes counterparty risk. The optimal collateral pol-
icy with novation is then k∗ = 0.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Collateral is costly to produce, and these
costs have to be borne entirely by farmers. Hence, collateral is a costly insurance device
against counterparty risk. Novation, to the contrary, simply pools all the counterparty
risk of individual farmers, thereby perfectly diversifying it. Requiring collateral would just
lower the revenue in all states without providing any additional insurance neither against
idiosyncratic default risk, nor against the aggregate price risk.19
Novation is not equivalent to guaranteeing farmers the futures price pn
f, as the revenue of the
CCP ﬂuctuates with the price risk θ. Still, novation beneﬁts farmers by providing savings
on collateral – implying a higher futures price (pn
f > pf) – and perfect diversiﬁcation of
counterparty risk, even though there is always some default in the aggregate. However,
novation alone cannot deliver the ﬁrst-best allocation. The CCP’s revenue depends on the
spot price, as it needs to sell the wheat from defaulted trades. There is thus still some room
to insure farmers against the aggregate price risk.
3.3.2 Novation and Mutualization
We now introduce mutualization of losses. When losses are mutualized, surviving bakers
pay (or receive) an additional fee φ(θ) to the CCP, which can depend on the aggregate state
of the economy. We denote by pm
f the price of the futures contract with mutualization and
again allow the CCP to request collateral k for any unit of wheat traded on the futures
market. An equilibrium with novation and mutualization is deﬁned as an equilibrium with
19With endogenous default, it is optimal to impose some collateral requirement. The reason is that
collateral acts as an incentive device to lower default. The derivation is available upon request from the
authors. Still, novation leads to a reduction in the optimal collateral requirement.
18novation where φ(θ)  = 0 for some θ. Bakers choose to trade futures contracts according to
max
qb
−µkqb + (1 − δ)
Z ￿





where the state-dependent fee schedule φ(θ) now inﬂuences the wealth of bakers. The no-
arbitrage condition then gives
p
m
f = 1 + (1 − µ(δ))k −
Z
φ(θ)dF(θ). (18)
where we have used the spot price p(θ) = θ. The futures price reﬂects the expected costs of
the mutualization scheme φ(θ) for bakers. Using the fact that the total production of wheat
is sold on the futures market and that farmers will choose the same production level q = 1,20
the revenue of the CCP is given by
R
m(θ) = (1 − δ)p
m
f + δ (p(θ) + k) + (1 − δ)φ(θ). (19)
The CCP’s revenue is composed of three terms. The ﬁrst two terms are due to the CCP
novating futures contracts. As in the previous section, the CCP receives the payment pm
f
from nondefaulting bakers. Also, the CCP can sell the wheat that was due to be transferred
to defaulting bakers on the spot market for the price p(θ), while still keeping the collateral
they pledged. Finally, the third term is the additional payment that bakers who have not
defaulted make to the CCP.
We now construct a fee schedule φ(θ) such that (i) Rm(θ) = 1, (ii) k = 0, and (iii)
R
φ(θ)dF(θ) = 0. Given such a fee schedule, the CCP can fully insure farmers – at the
expected fair price of pm
f = 1 for producing q = 1 – while not relying on costly collateral
at all to safeguard against default.21 As the mutualization fee averages to zero, bakers are
indiﬀerent in period 1 in participating in a futures market operated by a mutualized CCP
20The argument for symmetric production is similar to the one for novation.
21Indeed, if k > 0, one can never ensure a constant payment across states θ of at least 1. Integrating the
revenue equation with respect to the aggregate shock yields
Z
R
m(θ)dF(θ) = 1 + k (1 − µ) < 1.
Hence, for some state the aggregate revenue must be less than 1. More generally, one can design a fee
structure with constant revenue for any given collateral level and show that given this fee structure, it is
optimal to impose no collateral requirement.










p(θ)dF(θ) = 1. (21)
Since there is no expected transfers between bakers and farmers, the futures price does not
adjust at all and equals the ﬁxed payment Rm(θ) = 1 from the CCP to a farmer for selling
wheat forward. The transfer schedule implies that for θ < 1 bakers that have not defaulted
must pay more than the agreed futures price, while they pay less whenever θ > 1. Hence,
mutualization guarantees a ﬁxed payment that enables bakers to perfectly insure farmers
against the aggregate price risk.
Proposition 3. Novation and mutualization of losses implement the eﬃcient allocation
through trading on futures and spot markets.
To summarize, futures markets can allow for a better allocation of price risk. However, al-
locating this risk is imperfect whenever there is also counterparty risk: default reintroduces
price risk into futures contracts. Clearing arrangements help deal with this counterparty
risk. Novation improves the allocation by diversifying counterparty risk but does not insure
against it. Mutualization of losses provides such insurance. Importantly, these clearing ar-
rangements, which indirectly inﬂuence the terms of trades, do not directly alter the incentives
to trade.
4 Over-the-Counter Markets
While a CCP can achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation when products are standardized and traded
on a centralized exchange, how would it fare when products are specialized and traded over
the counter? To answer this question, we now introduce OTC trading, as originating from
the demand for diﬀerentiated products that cannot be traded centrally. Hence, the trading
environment is linked to the type of product being traded and cannot be changed. In the
model, aside from plain wheat, each baker can now also demand a special type of wheat
(called exotic) which only he can consume. We use exotic wheat as a metaphor for those
ﬁnancial contracts that are designed to fulﬁll the speciﬁc needs of the contract’s holder.
204.1 The Model
The environment is the same as before except for that there are now two types of wheat:
Plain and exotic. Within the type of exotic wheat, there are as many varieties of wheat as
there are bakers: Each baker likes to consume only his variety of exotic wheat. Farmers need
to specialize in their production. They can produce either plain wheat or some variety of
exotic wheat, but not both. We assume that farmers are as good in producing plain wheat
as exotic wheat, so that their preferences are represented by
U(x(θ),q,s) = −q − s + Eθ [logx(θ)]
where s is the amount of any exotic wheat they produce for a speciﬁc baker. Since farmers
have to specialize, we require that sisj = 0 for any i  = j and qsi = 0 for any i where si is
the production for a speciﬁc baker.
The preferences of baker i over general and exotic wheat are given by
V (y(θ,θi),si,x1,x2 (θ,θi)) = −µx1 + (1 − δ)Eθi,θ [θi log(y(θ,θi)) + σv(si) − x2 (θ,θi)],
where v is concave, v(0) = 0, v′(0) = ∞ and θi is again a preference shock in t = 2. We
assume that σ ∈ [σ,σ] is distributed across bakers according to some distribution H. It
is a ﬁxed, observable ex-ante characteristic of a baker and expresses how much a baker
likes his type of exotic wheat relative to general wheat. It thus describes the gains from
customization. We analyze the case in which σ is private information in Section 4.7 below.
An important feature of our setup is that bakers still value plain wheat, even if they consume
exotic wheat. More precisely, while bakers can do without exotic wheat, i.e., si = 0 is
possible, they cannot do without plain wheat. Therefore, all bakers will want to obtain some
plain wheat – either on the futures market in the ﬁrst period or in the spot market in second
period – while some bakers may not consume their exotic wheat.
To formalize bilateral OTC trading in exotic wheat, we employ a model of a one-sided search
in which farmers and bakers bargain over trading exotic wheat.22 The sequence of events
is as follows. Each farmer is randomly matched with exactly one baker. We assume for
simplicity that the farmers make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the baker that speciﬁes a price
pi, a contract size si, and a collateral requirement ki.23 If the baker accepts the oﬀer, the
22Trading exotic wheat in a centralized market with Walrasian pricing is impossible, as only one baker
likes a type of exotic wheat.
23In the Appendix, we brieﬂy discuss our results with more general Nash bargaining.
21farmer produces the exotic wheat for the baker, which is delivered in t = 2. If the baker
rejects it, the farmer moves on to trade on the competitive futures market, where a CCP
operates with novation and mutualization in place, as analyzed in the previous section.24
There is still a spot market for plain wheat in t = 2, where all bakers can purchase such
wheat against gold.
Once again, let us stress that a baker likes only his type of exotic wheat. Since exotic wheat
is special to only one baker, it is not worth anything to any other baker. Hence, there is no
value for this wheat on the spot market. In other words, it is not fungible. This introduces
extreme price risk into producing exotic wheat, as it cannot be sold after default on the
market.25
4.2 OTC Trading and Equilibrium
As we established earlier, equation (5) implies that a baker’s demand for plain wheat in the
spot market depends only on the spot price p(θ) and is not inﬂuenced by trading exotic wheat.
Furthermore, since bakers who access the futures market do not consume exotic wheat,
their problem on the futures market is as described previously. Therefore, futures contracts
continue to be priced by no-arbitrage so that a baker is indiﬀerent between trading on the
spot market or in the futures market. Also, since a CCP is operating under novation and
mutualization on the futures market, we know that k = 0. Therefore, given the equilibrium
futures contract (pf,0), a baker accepts an OTC oﬀer (si,pi,ki), if and only if
−µki + (1 − δ)
￿
σv(si) − (pi − ki) +
Z
˜ V (0)dF × G
￿
≥ (1 − δ)
Z
˜ V (0)dF × dG, (22)
If the baker accepts the oﬀer, a baker needs to pledge collateral ki in t = 1. If he is still alive
in the second period, the baker obtains si units of exotic wheat but incurs the cost of paying
the remaining pi − ki units of gold. Finally, the baker can acquire plain wheat on the spot
market with expected value being E ˜ V (0). If he rejects the oﬀer, the baker can either trade
on the futures market in which case he gets an expected payoﬀ ˜ V f, or on the spot market.
So, no arbitrage pricing yields ˜ V f = (1 − δ)
R ˜ V (0)dF × dG.
24If there is a measure n of farmers in the futures market, a measure n of bakers is randomly selected to
participate in the futures market – among those bakers are those who were not matched with a farmer and
those who rejected an oﬀer. This is feasible as there are always more bakers than farmers that do not trade
in exotic wheat.
25This is an extreme assumption that could be weakened by allowing exotic wheat to be sold as general
wheat in the spot market at a discount λ ∈ (0,1).
22The equilibrium contract is then given by the farmer’s take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer which solves
max
(si,pi,ki)
−si + (1 − δ)log(pi) + δ log(ki)
subject to
−µki + (1 − δ)[σv(si) − (pi − ki)] ≥ 0.
Here, with probability δ, the baker defaults leaving the farmer with only his collateral, as
exotic wheat is worthless and the farmer had to specialize his production. The ﬁrst-order
conditions yield
v







pi = (1 − δ)σv
′(si) (25)
where the last equation follows from the participation constraint of bakers.
Let ¯ s be the solution to equation (23). It is independent of σ, the surplus generated from
producing exotic wheat.26 Farmers use the price to extract all of the baker’s expected surplus
from consuming exotic wheat. To ensure participation of farmers in the OTC market, their
payoﬀ from trading OTC must be higher than their payoﬀ from selling a futures contract
for plain wheat. If there is a fraction n of farmers producing plain wheat, this participation
constraint is given by

















where Rm(θ)/n is deﬁned by the CCP’s revenue as given in equation (19). Since only a
fraction n of farmers is active on the futures market, we have that aggregate production is
nq, and since the production of plain wheat is q = 1, the aggregate supply of wheat is n. The
spot price is then given by p(θ) = θ/n, and arbitrage pricing yields a futures price equal to
pf = 1/n. This implies again that the CCP using novation and mutualization on the futures
market can ensure Rm(θ) = 1, and we obtain that farmers make an oﬀer to produce exotic
wheat if and only if the baker’s valuation σ satisﬁes
















26This is an implication of the distribution of bargaining power and log-utility. As discussed in the
Appendix, it does not inﬂuence our results.
23Therefore, there is a threshold ˆ σ(n) below which farmers prefer to produce plain wheat on
the futures market. This implies that the number of OTC trades is equal to the number of
bakers with σ above the threshold ˆ σ(n) that are matched with a farmer. Hence, we have
that
n = 1 − min
￿





where ˆ σ(n) satisﬁes equation (27) with equality.
Finding an equilibrium amounts to ﬁnding a ﬁxed point n∗ of equation (28). When n =
0, there is no production of plain wheat, and the spot price goes to inﬁnity. Hence, in
equilibrium there always must be some production of plain wheat. To have OTC trades
in equilibrium, we simply need to require that a farmer being matched with the highest σ
always prefers to produce exotic wheat.27
Proposition 4. An equilibrium with OTC trades exists if and only if
1 − ¯ s + log
￿






(1 − δ)(µ(δ) − 1)
￿
> 0.
Figure 2 summarizes the payoﬀ in the equilibrium allocation for farmers. Below the equilib-
rium threshold ˆ σ, farmers produce plain wheat and sell it in the futures market to obtain
the payoﬀ u(pf (ˆ σ)). All other farmers produce the same quantity s(σ) = ¯ s of exotic wheat
but extract increasingly more surplus as prices increase with σ. The farmers’ pay-oﬀs from
OTC trades are thus increasing in σ. Note that farmers on the OTC market choose to bear
the default risk associated with their counterparty. Again, this suggests that there can be
gains from employing CCP clearing.
4.3 Eﬃcient Allocations on the OTC Market
In order to evaluate the gains from CCP clearing on the OTC market, we next establish two
diﬀerent benchmarks that represent constrained eﬃcient allocations. In the ﬁrst benchmark,
a planner is constrained by feasibility and participation constraints only. In the second
benchmark, the planner is in addition constrained by the fact that farmers should receive all
the surplus from the match.
27If we had assumed a futures market without CCP clearing, the value of the outside option for farmers to
produce plain wheat would be lower. In equilibrium, there would then be more trades in the OTC market.





Figure 2: Payoﬀ for Farmers – Equilibrium with OTC Market
4.3.1 Eﬃcient Allocations
We take the size of the OTC market as exogenously given, in the sense that there are n
farmers in the futures market and 1−n farmers that produce in the OTC market.28 We give
only an informal discussion of the (constrained) eﬃcient allocation and relegate the analysis
to the Appendix.
The social planning problem takes the matches – parametrized by σ – as given. The planner
can direct farmers to produce a quantity s(σ) of exotic wheat and bakers to pay x2 (σ) units
of gold in those matches. Hence, the planner is restricted in that only one farmer can produce
for one baker: If the farmer produces s(σ) units of exotic wheat, then this is exactly the
consumption of the baker with characteristic σ. The planner, however, can redistribute the
aggregate gold payment
R ¯ σ
ˆ σ x2(σ)dH across farmers. Assuming that the planner in charge of
28Qualitatively, the properties of the eﬃcient allocation for the OTC market are independent of its size.
So we abstract from solving the optimal market size for OTC trading. However, this is an important issue, as
introducing CCP clearing for OTC trades will modify the size of the OTC market. An analysis of allocating
trades across markets is available from the authors upon request.













(1 − δ)[σv(s(σ)) − x2(σ)] ≥ ¯ v for all σ ∈ [ˆ σ, ¯ σ]
log(x(σ)) − s(σ) ≥ ¯ u for all σ ∈ [ˆ σ, ¯ σ]
s(σ),x2(σ),x(σ) ≥ 0 for all σ ∈ [ˆ σ, ¯ σ].
The ﬁrst constraint is a resource constraint on allocating gold across farmers. The other
constraints are participation constraints on farmers and bakers, and non-negativity restric-
tions.
One can show that – independent of the participation constraints and similar to the OTC
equilibrium – it is always optimal to “price” the OTC contract as
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = x(σ), (29)
for a given contract size s(σ). Hence, farmers receive consumption according to their
marginal contribution to the match surplus, i.e. the expected marginal beneﬁt from exotic
wheat consumption. If participation does not constrain the planner, the ﬁrst-best allocation
equates marginal beneﬁts and costs of producing gold and exotic wheat, thus yielding a
constant consumption across all matches, x(σ) = 1. This implies that, while the production
of exotic wheat is increasing in the surplus σ of the match, farmers suﬀer more production
costs as σ increases but consume the same so that their utility is decreasing in σ.
However, with this allocation, farmers who are in a high surplus match (i.e., large σ) have
more incentives to trade on the futures market; their consumption is ﬁxed, but they have to
produce a lot of exotic wheat, possibly shrinking their utility below ¯ u, the utility they would
obtain on the futures market.30 Figure 3 shows the farmer’s payoﬀ for the eﬃcient allocation
when farmers have the outside option of trading on the futures market. For σ ≥ σ∗, farmers
have an incentive to trade on the futures market, and this outside option drives a wedge
into the production of exotic wheat. Farmers need to be rewarded for higher production of
exotic wheat with higher consumption. Given the “pricing” formula (29), the production of
29We set x1(σ) = 0 so that no baker produces gold in the ﬁrst period, as this would be ineﬃcient.
30The bakers’ outside option is ¯ v = 0, as they do not derive any surplus form trading on the futures market









Figure 3: Farmer’s Payoﬀ – Eﬃcient Allocation






− s(σ) = ¯ u (30)
where ¯ u is the utility a farmer can obtain when trading on the futures market. Hence, it is
still eﬃcient to have the production of exotic wheat increasing with σ, but less so as farmers
need to be compensated for their production.31
4.3.2 Eﬃcient Allocations with Bargaining
We now also impose the bargaining protocol on the planner. We do so by imposing that the
planner’s allocation must give all the surplus to farmers while bakers receive ¯ v = 0.32 The
planner is therefore constrained to give at least as much as what the farmer would get if he
would resort to a bilaterally negotiated contract. The problem of the planner is the same














32Since farmers extract all surplus when trading bilaterally, it must be the case that the surplus bakers
receive is 0. If there were an allocation in the match that would make both the farmer and the baker better
oﬀ, the farmer could replicate the allocation and make himself better oﬀ by extracting all surplus via a
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Figure 4: Payoﬀ for Farmers – Eﬃcient Allocation with Bargaining
option is given by
¯ u = max
￿
−¯ s + log((1 − δ)σv(¯ s)) + δlog
￿
δ








which compares the options to trade bilaterally or on the futures market.
Figure 4 shows an eﬃcient allocation when we allow for the option to trade and clear bilat-
erally. When σ is low, the planner again achieves an allocation that depends only on the
outside option to trade in the futures market, with the production of wheat increasing in
this region. But now, the bilateral outside option becomes relevant for high σ. The planner
can still induce a contract size that is higher than the one with an OTC equilibrium, as
the planner can oﬀer insurance against idiosyncratic default risk without having to resort to
collateral. This increases the surplus in matches that can be redistributed to leave farmers
with exactly the same utility as with bilateral clearing. Most important, the contract size,
however, is then independent of σ for high valuations. This is a direct consequence of the
bilateral outside option in equation (31) and our log-linear preference structure.
To summarize, the equilibrium allocation diﬀers from the eﬃcient allocations with bilateral
outside options along two dimensions. First, farmers are not insured against the default risk.
Second, bargaining leads to a constant contract size across some OTC trades, although it is
eﬃcient to have the contract size increase with the surplus from the match as expressed by
σ.
28This suggests again that there is some room for CCP clearing to improve on the equilib-
rium allocation. Novation can diversify the default risk, and mutualization can change the
incentives to negotiate a particular contract size and payment. An important feature here
is that eﬃcient allocations – independent of the assumed outside option – share with the
equilibrium allocation that in any match the payment is equal to the expected marginal
beneﬁt of exotic wheat (see equation (29)). Hence, in order to achieve eﬃciency gains, CCP
clearing cannot distort bargaining directly. It will have to inﬂuence bargaining indirectly by
changing the surplus in a match.
4.4 CCP Clearing for OTC Trades
Suppose there is a CCP for clearing exclusively OTC trades.33 We again assume that the
CCP takes the terms of OTC trades (si,pi,ki) as given but novates the trade, i.e., becomes
the counterparty to every trade. Obviously, novation and mutualization will aﬀect the terms
of the trade, and we will solve for the equilibrium OTC contract in due course. We ﬁrst
specify what happens when a trade is submitted for clearing.
There are two important diﬀerences between clearing OTC contracts and futures contracts
for plain wheat. First, exotic wheat is not fungible; therefore, the CCP cannot obtain any
additional revenue from selling the exotic wheat on a spot market. Second, trading futures
on plain wheat implies automatic CCP clearing, i.e., there is no incentive to clear plain
wheat bilaterally by collateralizing the trade with k > 0. This is not the case on the OTC
market: Consider an OTC trade with terms (si,pi,ki). As shown above, the contracts diﬀer
in the underlying surplus σ and, hence, in their terms. If the CCP were to split its revenue
Rn equally across all farmers, as done when clearing futures, some farmers would get a lower
utility than others and might have no incentive to submit the trade for clearing through the
CCP. This implies that the CCP has to design a payment rule m(si,pi,ki) so that there are
incentives for the farmer and the baker to submit their trade for clearing to the CCP.34 A
payment rule m( ) of the CCP is incentive compatible, if for every OTC trade (si,pi,ki)








(1 − δ)(µ(δ) − 1)
￿
(32)
where the right-hand side denotes the farmer’s payoﬀ from the optimal OTC contract when
33Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2009) consider the problem of a CCP operating on two platforms and
possibly cross-subsidizing its operations.
34The problem of providing incentives to submit OTC trades to formal clearing was ﬁrst pointed out and
modeled by Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides (2009).
29clearing bilaterally. Note that while the CCP takes the OTC contract as given, its promised
payment m( ) and additional collateral requirements will alter the negotiated contract.35
Denote the additional collateral requested by the CCP ˜ ki. Its revenue is then given by
R
OTC = (1 − δ)
Z ¯ σ
ˆ σ




ki + ˜ ki
￿
dH(σ). (33)
Since exotic wheat is not fungible, there is extreme counterparty risk, causing the revenue for
the CCP to be independent of the aggregate demand shock θ. For an incentive compatible
payment rule m( ), all farmers with a match above the cut-oﬀ point ˆ σ for OTC trades submit
their trade for clearing with the CCP. The CCP then delivers then all exotic wheat si to
non-defaulting bakers and receives in return the outstanding net payment (pi−ki−˜ ki). The
CCP also obtains the collateral pledged for each OTC trade, which is equal to (ki + ˜ ki). We
again have included an additional (positive or negative) payment for bakers φi, which is now
independent of the aggregate demand shock θ, but can depend on the characteristics σ and
as such is lump-sum. The exotic wheat delivered to the CCP and owed to defaulting bakers





4.5 Gains from Novation
We ﬁrst consider a payment schedule that insures against the counterparty risk associated
with a speciﬁc contract (si,pi,ki). Consider the payment schedule
m(si,pi,ki) = (1 − δ)pi + δ
￿
ki + ˜ ki
￿
. (35)
This payment schedule perfectly diversiﬁes the counterparty risk associated with a contract
σi, as it simply pays out all funds the CCP receives, which are the payments from performing
contracts and the collateral seized from contracts in default. Here, we have set φi = 0 for
all σ. In this sense, novation shares only default risk among farmers. It is immediate that
the payment schedule is resource feasible for the CCP. Also, note that novation through the
payment schedule m depends only on the contract terms, but not on σ directly.
Given the payment schedule (35), if the trade is cleared through the CCP, farmers will make
35Here we have required that the payment m(si,pi,ki) fully insures farmers against the risk of default.
This does not have to be the case, but as farmers are risk averse, insurance against counterparty risk saves
the CCP resources.
30a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer according to
max
(si,pi,ki)




ki + ˜ ki
￿




pi − ki − ˜ ki
￿i
≥ 0 (37)
with ﬁrst-order conditions given by
−1 + ξ(1 − δ)σiv
′(si) = 0 (38)
1
(1 − δ)pi + δ
￿
ki + ˜ ki
￿ ≤ ξ (39)
1
(1 − δ)pi + δ
￿
ki + ˜ ki
￿ ≤ ξ
(1 − δ)(µ(δ) − 1)
δ
, (40)
where ξ is the multiplier on the participation constraint for the baker. Since (1−δ)(µ(δ)−1) >
δ, the last constraint will not hold with equality implying ki = 0. It follows then from the
binding participation constraint that
(1 − δ)σ(v(si) − v
′(si)) = (µ − 1)˜ ki. (41)
Equation (41) gives us the production of exotic wheat si as a function of collateral re-
quirements by the CCP. Requiring collateral increases insurance but drives a wedge in the
bargaining problem that causes the contract size si to increase with σ.36 When the CCP di-
versiﬁes counterparty risk through novation, it is thus never optimal for the CCP to provide
additional insurance through collateral.
Lemma 5. If the CCP shares default risk through novation, it is optimal to not require
collateral (˜ ki = ki = 0).
Proof. The baker has no beneﬁt from CCP clearing. Hence, we look at the utility gains
from collateral for farmers. Taking into account the solution of the bargaining problem, the
farmer receives the payment
m(si,pi,ki) = (1 − δ)σv
′(si(˜ ki)).
36Hence, having collateral requirements increase with the gains from customization can increase the con-
tract size for such contracts. Similarly, a negative collateral requirement could subsidize a trade, thereby
lowering the contract size si. However, as collateral is costly (µ > 1), providing incentives through it will be
dominated by a tax-transfer scheme.
31The value for a farmer from submitting the contract to the CCP is then given by















since v is strictly concave and the contract size si increases with collateral.
Novation gives farmers an incentive to submit all OTC trades for clearing to the CCP, as
the incentive constraint for clearing (32) is satisﬁed. The contract size stays unchanged at ¯ s,
but novation saves collateral costs and guarantees farmers exactly their expected payment
(1 − δ)pi. The negotiated price changes and is now given by
pi = σv
′(¯ s), (42)
which ensures that farmers obtain the payment of a bilateral contract independent of default.
Hence, they are again perfectly insured against counterparty risk.
The cut-oﬀ point for OTC trades ˆ σ is now given by
1 − ¯ s + log((1 − δ)ˆ σv






with n∗ solving (28) where σ(n) = ˆ σ. Since the value of an OTC trade increases for any
given σ, it must be the case that the cut-oﬀ point ˆ σ decreases, and as a consequence, there
are more OTC trades in equilibrium. We can thus characterize how the equilibrium on the
OTC market changes with novation through a CCP.
Lemma 6. CCP clearing with novation increases surplus for OTC trades and, therefore,
increases the size of the OTC market, i.e., ˆ σ and n∗ decline. This improves farmers’ welfare
but lowers bakers’ welfare, as the futures price increases.
Figure 5 shows that CCP clearing shifts the payoﬀ upwards for farmers that have traded OTC
beforehand. This will draw additional farmers to the OTC market, and as a consequence,








Figure 5: Payoﬀ for Farmers – CCP for OTC Market with Novation
introducing a CCP on the OTC market. However, this comes at a cost to bakers: They are
worse oﬀ because they have to pay more for plain wheat, and they get no extra surplus from
exotic wheat. This creates a possible conﬂict of interest for introducing CCP clearing on
OTC markets, which we do not analyze further.37
As is evident from Figure 5, with novation alone, CCP clearing cannot achieve an eﬃcient
allocation in the OTC market. The reason is that bargaining leads to socially ineﬃcient
contract sizes across σ. It would be optimal to have the contract size increase with σ. This
implies that farmers in matches with high σ should produce more wheat than farmers in
matches with low σ, at the cost of reducing their payoﬀ.38 We show next that a redistribu-
tive, revenue-neutral transfer scheme that charges additional fees to surviving bakers can
accomplish a better allocation.
4.6 Improving the Allocation of Default Risk
Beyond novation, a CCP now also charges additional ﬁxed fees φ(σ) for clearing – which
can be positive or negative for bakers that do not default, but depend on the (observable)
37While this stark result is somewhat an artifact of farmers extracting all the surplus, it will survive for a
suﬃciently unequal distribution of bargaining power.
38This is akin to a standard production externality where high productivity matches do not take into
account how their marginal product compares with the average one in the economy.





−µki + (1 − δ)[σv(si) − pi − φ(σ) − ki] ≥ 0.
Suppose the CCP uses the same payment schedule m( ) as with novation (see equation (35)).
The fee φ(σ) leaves the structure of the contract the same but inﬂuences the total surplus of
the OTC trade. As the ﬁrst-order conditions remain the same, it follows immediately from
the participation constraint that the negotiated contract size si solves
σ [v(si) − v
′(si)] = φ(σ). (44)
Like collateral with novation, the fee φ(σ) drives a wedge into the choice of the contract
size, but without inﬂuencing the pricing of the contract directly. As v is concave, this wedge
causes si to be an increasing function of φ(σ).
Taking the size of the OTC market with novation as given, the CCP can thus inﬂuence the
contract size across trades through its fee schedule φ. A positive fee will reduce surplus in a
match. The farmer would like to maintain the surplus by adjusting his oﬀer to produce more
at a lower price. Similarly, a negative fee subsidizes an OTC trade by increasing the surplus.
It is now easier for the farmer to extract surplus, and he will produce less at a higher price.
The CCP, however, faces additional restrictions on the fee schedule φ. Given the optimal
collateral policy ˜ ki = ki = 0,39 the CCP’s revenue is now given by
R
OTC = (1 − δ)
Z ¯ σ
ˆ σ
(pi + φ(σ))dH(σ). (45)
Hence, the payment schedule m( ) is resource feasible if and only if the fees φ are purely
redistributive (or revenue neutral) across OTC trades,
Z ¯ σ
ˆ σ
φ(σ)dH(σ) = 0. (46)
Furthermore, the CCP needs to induce trades to be submitted for clearing; i.e., the payment
schedule has to be incentive feasible according to equation (32). Finally, we also require
that farmers do not have an incentive to switch to the futures market because φ reduces the
39It is straightforward to verify that the optimal collateral policy with novation is not aﬀected by the
mutualization scheme.
34surplus of a trade. Hence, we require that the schedule φ(σ) induces a contract size such
that











where we have used the payment schedule m and the fact that the CCP takes the size of
the OTC market with novation as given. Since these restrictions simply mirror the trading
frictions for a planner, there exists a fee schedule φ∗ that implements the constrained eﬃcient
allocation with trading frictions.
Proposition 7. CCP clearing with novation together with a revenue-neutral transfer scheme
achieves the eﬃcient allocation with bargaining (x∗(σ),s∗(σ)) on the OTC market by employ-
ing a payment schedule and fee structure
m
∗(si,pi,ki) = (1 − δ)pi
φ




The optimal fee structure φ∗ implies a ﬁxed positive fee for high valuations. As σ declines,
the fee structure eventually declines and becomes negative.
Proof. Let (x∗(σ),s∗(σ)) be the constrained eﬃcient allocation where the planner is restricted
by bargaining. Given the payment schedule m(si,pi,ki) = (1 − δ)pi, the solution to the
bargaining problem has to satisfy
σv
′(si) = pi.





∗(σ))] = φ(σ) = σ[v(si) − v
′(si)]
for all σ ∈ [ˆ σ, ¯ σ]. By concavity of v, we then have si = s∗(σ) and a payment equal to





for all σ ∈ [ˆ σ, ¯ σ]. By construction, the concavity of v implies then that the solution to the
bargaining problem is (x∗(σ),s∗(σ)) for all σ ∈ [ˆ σ, ¯ σ].
Hence, it suﬃces to show that the resource constraint of the CCP is satisﬁed by the payment



































where the last equality follows from the fact that the eﬃcient allocation with bargaining is
resource feasible.
For the shape of φ∗, we need only to characterize how the optimal contract size changes with
σ. For σ high enough, the optimal contract size is given by











δ + (µ − 1)
￿￿
< 0,
which implies that s∗(σ) is constant and larger than the equilibrium value with bilateral
clearing ¯ s. Hence, φ∗(σ) > 0.
For σ such that the futures market is the relevant outside option of farmers, the relationship
−s
∗(σ) + log((1 − δ)σv
′(s





implies that s∗(σ) increases with σ, and so does φ∗. Finally, when farmers’ utility declines
with σ, the fact that x∗(σ) = (1−δ)σv′(s∗(σ)) implies that s∗(σ) has to increase as well.
As shown in Figure 6, the optimal fee schedule φ∗ taxes high surplus matches and subsidizes
low surplus ones. Taxing surplus reduces what farmers can extract and, as a consequence,
the contract size will increase. A subsidy of course has exactly the opposite eﬀect. Inter-
estingly, the CCP needs to employ novation in order to change contract sizes. Novation
oﬀers diversiﬁcation at no cost, while bilateral clearing would require costly collateral as a
substitute for diversifying risk. The CCP is able to use this beneﬁt in order to extract some
of the surplus from the match by imposing a positive fee φ(σ). At this fee, matches with high
valuations are then made indiﬀerent between clearing bilaterally with collateral and clearing
through a CCP, as represented in the ﬁgure by the downward shift in farmers’ utility. In











Figure 6: Payoﬀ for Farmers – CCP for OTC Market with Novation and Mutualization
Since the CCP takes the terms of the bilaterally negotiated contract as given, it cannot
inﬂuence the structure of the contract and achieve a better allocation. Here, the key frictions
are that farmers can extract all the surplus from bakers.40 The transfer scheme can therefore
alleviate but not entirely remove the production ineﬃciency in the OTC market. The CCP
could circumvent this friction and negotiate the terms of trade directly with bakers and
farmers. It would thus assume the role of a dealer that goes well beyond the mere clearing
and settlement of trades. We will discuss this issue further below.
4.7 The Transfer Scheme with Private Information
The CCP’s fee schedule is conditional on the valuation of bakers σ. However, it is unlikely
that this valuation is publicly observable. It seems natural to assume that it is private
information for the parties of the OTC trade. Next we outline the constrained eﬃcient
allocation under private information and relegate details to the Appendix.
The planner now needs to provide incentives for the match to reveal the true valuation σ
of the OTC trade; in other words, we require that a match cannot achieve a higher payoﬀ
by misrepresenting its valuation.41 We use a direct mechanism where agents in a match
40As we argue in the Appendix, this holds more generally whenever the distribution of bargaining power
diﬀers from the weights in the planner’s objective function.
41This relates our problem to the literature on Mirleesian Taxation, in which a planner taxes labor income
37directly report their valuation σ with the planner, imposing an allocation (x2(σ),s(σ)) that
is a function of the reported σ.
We require again that the planner has to respect the bargaining frictions, so that farmers
extract all surplus from trade; in other words, we impose the restriction x2(σ) = σs(σ) for
all σ on the allocations the planner can propose. This restrictions limits what σ a match
can report. If a match with true valuation σ reported σ′ instead, it must be the case that
σv(s(σ
′)) − x2(σ




since otherwise the baker in the match would receive a negative surplus and, hence, would
prefer to trade on the futures markets. Hence, only reports of lower valuations than the true
one (σ′ ≤ σ) are feasible. Taking into account that bakers never receive any surplus, the
truth-telling constraints for any valuation σ are thus given by
−s(σ) + log(x(σ)) ≥ −s(σ
′) + log(x(σ
′)) for all σ
′ ≤ σ. (49)
This condition implies that in the constrained eﬃcient allocation, the utility for farmers must
be weakly increasing in σ. If it were not, farmers would have an incentive to misrepresent
the valuation of the match.
Still, it is eﬃcient to have a high production of exotic wheat for high valuation matches.
Therefore, the production of exotic wheat should be increasing in σ, but farmers also need to
have a (weakly) increasing payoﬀ in σ. Figure 7 exhibits the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
The planner guarantees a minimum payoﬀ for farmers, but above a threshold ˜ σ the bilateral
outside option binds so that the payoﬀ is strictly increasing in σ. It is important to realize
here that while a farmer in a match with valuation σ < ˜ σ has an incentive to report any
σ′ > ˜ σ, such a report is not feasible as the baker would just object to it.
A CCP can implement this constrained eﬃcient allocation as before. Crucially, we assume
that the CCP declines to clear any trade (si,pi) that does not satisfy
pi = σv
′(s(σ)) (50)
for some σ ∈ [ˆ σ, ¯ σ]. This restricts the possibilities for OTC trades to misrepresent their
valuation when submitting it for CCP clearing.42 Gains from novation can be achieved with
with output being observable, but productivity being private information.
42This then corresponds to a direct revelation mechanism where traders simply report σ to the CCP. The
CCP then levies a mutualization fee φ(σ) and “clears” the corresponding contract (s(σ),p(σ)), where we
have taken into account that no collateral will be used.
38¯ σ σ σ
φ > 0






Figure 7: Payoﬀ for Farmers – Mutualization with Private Information
the payment schedule m = (1−δ)pi and are necessary for taxing high valuation matches. It




′) ≥ 0. (51)
Since σ′v(s(σ′)) − pi(σ′) − φ(σ′) = 0, only farmers with σ > σ′ can pretend to be σ′. Also,
a baker would get a positive payoﬀ whenever a farmer were to lie, since the payment would
be σ′v′(s(σ′)) < σv′(s(σ′)). Hence, the fee schedule φ(σ) satisﬁes truth-telling if for all σ
U(σ,φ(σ)) ≥ U(σ,φ(σ
′)) for all σ
′ ≤ σ, (52)
where U( ) is the utility for a farmer of making announcement σ′ given the true valuation is
given by σ.
Using the constrained eﬃcient allocation as shown in Figure 7, we obtain that the payment





satisﬁes the truth-telling constraint. The reason is that the bilateral outside option implies
again a ﬁxed positive fee for high σ, which gives a strict preference to farmers to reveal their
type of match. For low σ, the fee schedule is negative and increases with σ so that farmers
39are indiﬀerent between announcing their true valuation or any lower one. For high σ, the
fee schedule is positive and increasing. In this way, a match with a high valuation has less
surplus if it is cleared through the CCP. To induce bakers to participate, given the terms of
the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, requires a higher production of exotic wheat. Hence, the contract
size is again increasing with the valuation in a match. The CCP can charge φ(σ) > 0 to high
σ, as it taxes the additional surplus that originates from the diversiﬁcation of counterparty
risk. This revenue can then be transferred to matches with a lower valuation, with the eﬀect
of reducing their production of exotic wheat. Hence, private information does not prevent a
redistribution of default risk but limits it.
5 Conclusion
Our paper oﬀers a formal model of a CCP and of clearing more generally. We ﬁnd that CCP
clearing with novation and mutualization of losses is part of an eﬃcient market structure
for standardized ﬁnancial contracts that are centrally traded on a competitive market. A
CCP that clears OTC trades has to take into account, however, that fungibility of contracts
is limited and that due to their customized nature formal clearing remains a choice for the
counterparties.
The discussion about formal clearing of OTC transactions has primarily focused on the
beneﬁts oﬀered by netting but has largely overlooked how intricate clearing is for such
transactions. A CCP can still oﬀer novation – albeit not in the form of a guarantee –
and it is precisely these gains from novation that can give incentives for counterparties to
formally clear OTC transactions through a CCP. With such incentives in place, a CCP is
then perfectly situated to aﬀect both the level of risk individual counterparties have to bear
and the overall allocation of risk in the market.
We have deliberately abstracted from one important question that the introduction of CCP
clearing might entail moral hazard. This is clearly pivotal for addressing the optimal col-
lateral structure of a CCP, and we think it deserves particular attention. In this context, it
will be necessary to study the optimal scope for CCP clearing in the sense that one creates
an institution that is too-big-to-fail and entails potentially an overall increase in risk due to
a moral hazard problem.
Finally, some of our assumptions are quite strong but are driven by the desire to derive stark
results. One issue is to extend our analysis to cases in which counterparties contemplate
default if it is in their interest. Collateral will then play a crucial role as an incentive device.
40Also, we have assumed that preferences are represented by log-linear utility. This simpliﬁes
the analysis greatly, as there are no wealth eﬀects from introducing insurance and there are
no distortions from reallocating risk. It would be interesting to see how our results fare
under diﬀerent preference structures, but we doubt this would aﬀect the main message of
what CCP clearing adds to ﬁnancial markets and how it diﬀers for OTC markets.
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417 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The bakers’ welfare is not aﬀected by the market structure. Since k = 0 is feasible, farmers
must be better oﬀ with a futures market, as they are partially insured against the aggregate
shock θ.
The utility of a farmer given collateral k is given by
Uf = (1 − δ)log(1 + (1 − µ(δ))k) + δ
Z
log(θ + k)dF(θ).
Hence, the optimal level of collateral solves
∂Uf/∂k ≡ ϕ(k) =
1 − µ(δ)
1 + (1 − µ(δ))k





It is easy to check that utility is strictly concave in k, i.e., ϕ′(k) < 0 for all δ. Hence, it is
optimal to set k > 0, unless ϕ(0) ≤ 0. This is the case for critical values of µ and δ such
that





Since 1/θ is a strictly convex function and E(θ) = 1, we have µ(δ) > 1 and ∂µ(δ)/∂δ > 0
for all δ > 0.
To show that futures trades are never fully collateralized, set pk
f = ¯ k = 1+(1−µ(δ))¯ k. The
ﬁrst-order condition then yields
1 − µ(δ)
¯ k
(1 − δ) + δ
Z
1






(1 − µ(δ)) + µ(δ)δ + δ
Z ￿ ¯ k








(1 − µ) + δ
Z ￿ ¯ k






as µ > 1 and θ > 0. Since utility is concave, any k ≥ ¯ k can thus never be optimal, which
completes the proof.
427.2 Constrained Eﬃcient Allocations on OTC Markets
7.2.1 First-Best Allocations
Consider all matches in the OTC market and suppose that there are no outside options the













(1 − δ)x2(σ)dH(σ) (λ1)
x2(σ) ≥ 0 (λ2(σ))




λ1 = 1 − λ2(σ)
Therefore, if λ2(σ) = 0 for all σ so that all bakers produce, then λ1 = 1 and x(σ) = 1. The

















(1 − δ)x2(σ)dH(σ) (λ1)
x2(σ) ≥ 0 (λ2(σ))
(1 − δ)[σv(s(σ)) − x2(σ)] ≥ ¯ v (λ3(σ))
log(x(σ)) − s(σ) ≥ ¯ u (λ4(σ))
where ¯ v = 0 and ¯ u are the payoﬀs from the bakers’ and farmers’ outside options, respectively.














Since s(σ) > 0 and σ > 0 for all σ, we can assume without loss of generality that x2(σ) > 0




The participation constraints give us the optimal allocation. First, notice that λ3(σ) = λ3
for all σ as λ2(σ) = 0. Hence, we need to consider only two cases.
Case 1: λ3 = 0. In this case, we know λ1 = 1. If λ4(σ) = 0, then the solution is the
eﬃcient allocation, i.e. (x(σ),s(σ)) = (x∗,s∗(σ)). Since x(σ) = x∗ = 1 is constant and s∗(σ)
is increasing in σ, the farmer’s participation constraint may be binding when σ is large so that
λ4(σ) > 0. In particular, this is the case for all σ > σ∗ such that log((1 − δ)σ∗v′(s∗(σ))) =
¯ u + s∗(σ).
44Suppose then λ3 = 0 and λ4(σ) > 0. The allocation for the match is
log((1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ))) = ¯ u + s(σ)
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = x(σ) > 1.
Note that farmers consume more than the eﬃcient amount.
The individual payment x2(σ) is indeterminate, but the total aggregate payment needs to
be suﬃcient to cover the consumption of the farmers. Hence, a necessary and suﬃcient













This is suﬃcient, since the planner can then set x2(σ) = σv(s(σ)) − ε, for ε small enough.
This is necessary, since the equilibrium we consider gives a positive surplus to all bakers so
that σv(s(σ)) > x2(σ) for all σ. When this condition is not satisﬁed, bakers have no surplus,
which is the second case.




for all σ < σ∗ and
log((1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ))) = ¯ u + s(σ)
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = x(σ)
for all σ ≥ σ∗.
Case 2: λ3 > 0. When the above allocation is not feasible, the constrained eﬃcient al-
location must be such that bakers have no surplus, or x2(σ) = σv(s(σ)). If λ4(σ) = 0, we
get





Hence, the payment is constant, but less than the eﬃcient amount. The ﬁrst-order conditions
give us s(σ) as the solution to
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = ˜ x.
45When x(σ) is constant, the farmer’s participation constraint might bind for σ large enough,
as s(σ) is increasing in σ. Hence given ˜ x, there is some cut-oﬀ ˜ σ, such that for all σ > ˜ σ, the
farmer’s participation constraint will be violated if s(σ) is set such that (1 − δ)σv′ (s(σ)) = ˜ x.
This implies λ4(σ) > 0 for all σ > ˜ σ, and the allocation is given by
log((1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ))) = ¯ u + s(σ)
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = x(σ).
To complete the characterization of the constrained optimal solution when λ3 > 0, we ﬁnd










To summarize, when bakers have no surplus, the constrained eﬃcient allocation is described
by
˜ x < x
∗
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = ˜ x
for all σ < ˜ σ and
log((1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ))) = ¯ u + s(σ)
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = x(σ)
for all σ ≥ ˜ σ.
7.2.3 Eﬃcient Allocations with Bargaining
The planner now has to respect that farmers make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to bakers and
that a match akways has the option to trade bilaterally with collateral. This implies that













− s(σ) + log(x(σ)) ≥ ¯ u (λ(σ))










Note that ¯ u has the following deﬁnition when farmers can either trade futures (and a CCP
operates on the futures market) or clear bilaterally,
¯ u = max
￿
−¯ s + log((1 − δ)σv(¯ s)) + δlog
￿
δ








For low σ, it is more proﬁtable for farmers to trade futures than clear bilaterally. The farmers
participation constraint reads
−s(σ) + log((1 − δ)σv





Denote by s′(σ) the level of production such that this constraint binds. We have that
s′(σ) is an increasing function of σ with the utility of farmers being constant so that their
consumption of gold has to increase over this range of σ. As σ increases further, it becomes
more proﬁtable to clear bilaterally than to trade futures. Then, for these levels of σ > ˜ σ,
and to replace the ﬁrst-order condition in the farmers’ participation constraint, we obtain
the following participation constraint for farmers








µ − (1 − δ)
￿
so that s(σ) = s′ is the same for all σ such that this constraint binds. As the right-hand side
is negative, by concavity of v we have that s′ > ¯ s. The solution is then the same as in the
case in which there is no bargaining friction and there is no surplus for any bakers.




for all σ < σ′,
−s(σ) + log((1 − δ)σv









for all σ ≥ ˜ σ. The value of x′ is again given by the resource constraint.
7.2.4 Eﬃcient Allocations with Bargaining and Private Information
We now consider the planner’s problem with bilateral outside options under private infor-
mation. The planner does not observe σ. The match then makes a report regarding σ to
the planner, and the planner chooses an allocation based on the report.
We assume that the planner knows how the bargaining power is distributed. Since bakers will
have no surplus, a report must be feasible for the match, which implies that the truth-telling
constraint is given by
−s(σ) + log(x(σ)) ≥ −s(σ
′) + log(x(σ
′)) for all σ ≥ σ
′.
Note that this condition requires that farmers’ utility is nondecreasing in σ. The planner’s



















−s(σ) + log(x(σ)) ≥ ¯ u(σ)
−s(σ) + log(x(σ)) ≥ −s(σ
′) + log(x(σ
′)) for all σ ≥ σ
′
where ¯ u(σ) is the outside option of a bilateral OTC trade with collateral.
Suppose ﬁrst that none of the participation constraints is binding. Note that x(σ) is in-
48creasing with σ, since any constrained eﬃcient allocation satisﬁes (1 − δ)σv′(s(σ)) = x(σ).
The constrained optimal solution must then give the same utility ¯ u to all farmers with the
solution being described by
(1 − δ)σv
′(s(σ)) = x(σ)
−s(σ) + log(x(σ)) = ¯ u.
To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that there is a subset Σ with positive measure
such that for all σ ∈ Σ, −s(σ) + log(x(σ)) > ¯ u. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that for σ ∈ Σ, −s(σ) + log(x(σ)) = ¯ u′ > ¯ u. Hold s(σ) constant for all σ ∈ Σ, deﬁne
˜ x(σ) = x(σ) − ε(σ) for all σ ∈ Σ such that −s(σ) + log(˜ x(σ)) = ¯ u′ − ε for some ε > 0
suﬃciently small. This frees up total resources
R
Σ ε(σ)dH(σ) that can be distributed to
all farmers in matches with σ / ∈ Σ so that their utility shifts up uniformly still satisfying
truth-telling. Since x(σ) is increasing with σ and the utility is concave, the gain in utility for
these agents will more than compensate for the loss in utility of farmers with σ ∈ Σ. Hence,
the original allocation was not constrained eﬃcient. A contradiction.
Suppose now that the participation constraints bind for some σ. Since truth-telling requires
non-decreasing utility for farmers, it is optimal to have utility for farmers as high as possible,
but constant, until the bilateral outside option becomes relevant. Recall that ¯ u(σ) is increas-





, but ¯ u ≥ ¯ u(σ) only for σ < ˜ σ for some




−s(σ) + log(x(σ)) = ¯ u for all σ ≤ ˜ σ
−s(σ) + log(x(σ)) = ¯ u(σ) for all σ > ˜ σ








7.3 Generalized Nash Bargaining
The goal of this section is to show that Nash bargaining also leads to an ineﬃcient contract
size in OTC trading. We ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium allocations on the OTC market where
49the counterparties to an OTC trade have access to novation by a CCP, but where there is
no mutualization. Novation here increases surplus in the OTC trade, which is split between
the farmer and baker according to the distribution of bargaining power. As before, this does
not inﬂuence the optimal structure of the contact.
In an OTC trade, the valuation σ is common knowledge for the trading parties. Suppose
there is Nash bargaining where η is the relative weight of farmers. Deﬁne the surplus of
farmers and bakers as S1 and S2 respectively. We then have
S1 = log((1 − δ)pi) − s(σ) − ¯ u
S2 = (1 − δ)[σv(s(σ)) − pi] − ¯ v,
where we already have used the payment schedule m under novation. The outside options
are participation in the futures market, which oﬀers no surplus for bakers (¯ v = 0), but
positive surplus for farmers. Again, with novation it is not optimal to use collateral and the








yielding the following ﬁrst-order conditions




= (1 − δ)σv
′(s).
The pricing of the OTC contract is once again independent of the bargaining assumption
and equates the price to the expected marginal beneﬁt of the transactions for bakers. Hence,








′(s)) − s − ¯ u].
Note that ¯ u is constant. Hence, for any given η ∈ (0,1), the contract size increases with σ
(i.e., ds/dσ > 0). Again, there is a cut-oﬀ point with respect to σ – depending on η – such
that only matches with a higher surplus will carry out OTC trades. Also, if the bargaining
power shifts toward bakers (i.e., η declines), the contract size s will increase for all σ.
The eﬃcient allocation that respects the outside option to trade on the futures market gives
50zero surplus to farmers for suﬃciently high σ (see the previous section in this Appendix). If
the farmers receive zero surplus in the solution above, we have that v′(s) = v(s) independent
of σ. Otherwise, the surplus is positive for farmers (unless all bargaining power rests with
bakers, or η = 0), and hence, there is an ineﬃcient contract size due to bargaining. Also,
note that this ineﬃciency does not disappear if the bargaining power is equally distributed
(η = 1/2) and, thus, mirrors the weighting in the planner’s objective function. This implies
that the beneﬁts of mutualization are independent of our bargaining assumption.
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